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Abstract
In this paper we analyze cooperation in R&D in the form of RJVs.
We show that the optimal size of an RJV does not only depend on the
degree of spillovers, as literature suggests, but also on the cost function
of R&D activities. Moreover, the explicit consideration of the fact that
R&D projects take time to complete shows that benefits from coopera-
tion in R&D not only allow RJVs to carry out larger R&D projects, but
also to reduce the time to completion for projects with a given size and,
consequently, to accelerate the acquisition of the benefits associated with
the innovation.
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The study of innovations has become an important area of research in the eco-
nomic literature due to its contribution to economic growth. However, there ex-
ists a series of market failures related to the research and development (R&D)
activity including for instance the problem of appropriability or the duplication
of effort1 that could undermine incentives of innovators to undertake research
investments. Therefore, governments apply a set of policy instruments to correct
these market imperfections. A policy that has received attention in the recent
past has been the promotion of cooperative R&D. Aside from enabling the par-
ticipants to overcome a cost-of-development barrier impenetrable to any of them
alone, one advantage of cooperative R&D is the elimination of duplication of
effort. As pointed out in Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002), Research Joint Ven-
tures (RJVs) are commonly seen as a potential solution to the small amount of
resources invested in R&D activities in Europe and to the low productivity of
these resources. Framework Programs for Science and Technology (FPST) and
the EUREKA program are examples of these policies in the European Union.
Recent years have witnessed the development of a large literature analyzing
cooperation in R&D activities. For a survey of different kinds of inter-firm part-
nerships see Hagedoorn et al. (2000) and Hagedoorn (2002). In the theoretical
literature papers studying cooperation in R&D include for instance Katz (1986),
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992),
Petit and Tolwinski (1999), and Cellini and Lambertini (2002). Several forms of
RJVs have been studied in the literature where, while sharing the outcome of
their R&D efforts, firms can decide unilaterally on their R&D investments, or
they can coordinate them in order to maximize the sum of overall profits (RJV
competition and RJV cartelization). In the latter case they internalize the effect
that the R&D effort of one firm has on the profits of the other firms in the RJV
1For a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the R&D activity see for instance
Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Cohen and Levin (1989), Reinganum (1989), Cohen (1995), and
Sena (2004).
2
(the so-called combined-profits externality), and consequently the amount of
profitable R&D investments that firms are able to carry out is higher. However,
if firms are analyzing the investment decision in a R&D project of a given size,
and this project is profitable for an RJV independent of the way that firms
adopt investments decisions, a question arises: is there some additional criterion
that could help them to decide on which is the best organizational structure?
In many papers it is assumed that R&D expenditures lead to immediate
effects (see, e.g., among many others, Cellini and Lambertini, 2002), either in
product differentiation or in cost reduction. However, in reality it takes time
to develop a breakthrough, which is the topic of this paper. As pointed out
in Martin (1994), p. 362, “Like all investment projects, R&D involves time in
an essential way. A firm seeking to develop a new technique or product must
sink its funds into the project for some time before it profits from lower costs
or revenues from the sale of a new product”. The issue of time to complete
in an R&D project was also analyzed in, e.g., Miltersen and Schwartz (2004)
in a two-decision maker framework and Kort (1998) in a one-decision maker
framework, but where these papers concentrate on uncertainty, we undertake a
game theoretic approach within a deterministic framework. By including time to
complete in the R&D process we show that cooperation in R&D will not only
allow firms in the RJV to undertake larger R&D projects, but also to finish
them in a shorter time, accelerating the acquisition of the gains associated with
the innovation.
Another issued studied in previous works relates to the optimal number
of firms for the best RJV performance. As the number of firms in an RJV
increases, the required per-firm R&D effort for a given project is lower, but at
the same time competition in the output market increases, and thus the final
gain reduces. De Bondt et al. (1992) and Poyago-Theotoky (1995) study the
optimal number of firms in an industry in order to maximize the effective R&D.
Both papers analyze an industry with R&D aimed at cost reduction, and find
that the optimal size of the RJV depends on the degree of spillovers. For the
case of perfect spillovers and R&D cooperation, the optimal size includes all the
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firms in the industry (Poyago-Theotoky, 1995), while with RJV competition
the optimal size, being independent of the R&D cost function, is two firms (De
Bondt et al., 1992). We employ a more general R&D cost function and show
that its shape is crucial for the optimal RJV size. In particular we find that in
case the cost function consists of both a linear and a quadratic term (Poyago-
Theotoky (1995) and De Bondt et al. (1992) only have a quadratic term in
the cost function), the optimal number of firms in the RJV increases with the
increase of the parameter associated with the quadratic part relative to the
linear parameter.
In this paper we jointly address cooperation in R&D in the form of RJV
and time to complete. We consider an industry with N symmetric firms where
market competition takes place à la Cournot. Firms join an RJV aimed at pro-
cess innovation, so that they could reduce their unitary and constant production
cost once the innovation is achieved, but for which a positive time interval of
successive R&D efforts is required. While competing in the output market, firms
in the RJV can decide independently or coordinately on their R&D investments.
In the latter case we will also consider the case of collusion in the output market.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in section 2.
In section 3 we solve the model for the non-cooperative and cooperative cases.
Section 4 analyzes and compares results for the different cases, and their opti-
mality from a social point of view is studied in section 5. Finally, in section 6
conclusions are presented.
2 The Model
Consider an industry with N symmetric firms from which n of them (n ≤
N) constitute an RJV aimed at developing a process innovation. The R&D
improvement made in the joint venture due to the participation of firm i at
time t is denoted by xi(t). The costs of performing this improvement are given
by axi(t) + bx2i (t), where a and b are positive constants. The fact that these
costs are convex in the research progress can be motivated by realizing that
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increasing the research improvement is more difficult when the improvement is
already large. Then more qualified people and/or equipment are needed, which
is more expensive. R&D effort is typically irreversible, so that xi(t) ≥ 0.
The firms being active in the joint venture are aware that the total R&D
improvement needed to complete the project at time t is known and equals Y (t).
Recalling that the number of firms that participate in the joint venture is n,
these definitions lead to the following state equation:
Ẏ (t) = −
n∑
j=1
xj(t), Y (0) = Y0 > 0. (1)
where Y0 is the anticipated total R&D improvement required to complete the
project.
The project is finished once a sufficient amount of R&D improvement is
undertaken, which is the case when
Y (T ) = 0. (2)
The value of the innovation for the individual firm, obtained at the moment
that (2) holds, depends on two factors: the number of firms that can make use
of this innovation and the behavior of these firms in the output market. We
consider initially an industry with N firms, which play a Cournot game in a
homogeneous product market facing a linear inverse demand function
D−1(Q) = A − BQ,
where Q =
∑N
i=1 qi and qi, i = 1, ..., N, is the per-firm output. Once the inno-
vation is completed, the constant unit cost of firms in the RJV is reduced from
c to ĉ, where (c, ĉ) are the corresponding costs before and after the innovation
is achieved, respectively, and A > c. We assume that competition in the output
market is of the same kind before and after collaboration in the R&D project.
We also consider that the innovation is of the drastic type,2 so that after the
process innovation only n firms will be active in the output market. Hence, when
2See Tirole (1988).
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firms act non-cooperatively in the output market, the per-firm gain associated
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where r is the discount rate (r > 0 and constant). When firms cooperate in the















Hereafter, and without loss of generality we consider that n = N , that is, all
the firms present initially in that market join the RJV.3
Within this Cournot setting it holds that R′(n) < 0. Alternatively, we could
consider the case where R′(n) > 0. The latter holds in case of a positive network
externality, which implies that the value of the innovated product increases with
the number of users.
Finally, note that other assumptions on the output market can be included
by a direct modification of the functions (3) and (4). As this will lead only to a
different amount of the final gain, it is straightforward to extend the analysis to
these other settings. In particular, the case of firms operating in a market with
product differentiation will be briefly reviewed in Section 4.
3 Optimal RJV R&D policy
For this problem it holds that there exists a maximal amount of R&D improve-
ment needed to complete the project, given that the innovation project is still
profitable. We determine this critical level and study how it is affected by the
3Note however that the case n < N is quantitatively similar to an increase in the final
function value, since the per-firm gain of competition is a decreasing function of n for the
three analyzed cases. On the contrary, the case of n > N , that is, the incorporation of new
firms in the RJV, and subsequently in the output market, would lead to a decrease in the
final function. All these situations point to the existence of incentives to enter and exit the
market.
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parameters of the model depending on the behavior of the firms (both in the
R&D phase and in the output market). With respect to the behavior in the
R&D phase, firms can adopt an attitude of collaboration, by coordinating their
R&D efforts in order to maximize the sum of overall profits, or no collaboration,
by deciding unilaterally on their R&D efforts. The latter case corresponds to the
RJV competition model discussed in Kamien et al. (1992), where firms compete
but share their R&D efforts avoiding duplication of R&D activities, while the
former corresponds to RJV cartelization.
In case firms cooperate in the R&D phase, they maximize















T = inf [t | Y (t) = 0] .
In case firms do not cooperate, the value of firm i, being a participant in the
RJV, is given by













3.1 Non-cooperation in R&D
In case firms in the RJV do not cooperate during the R&D phase, the aim is to
find the Markov perfect Nash equilibrium.4 The value of the project for firm i
is given by (6), so that the HJB-equation is
rVi(Y ) = max
xi










with the boundary condition
Vi(0) = Rnc(n). (8)
The first order condition is
xi = − 12b (a + V
′
i ) , (9)
4See, e.g., Dockner et al., 2000.
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and substitution of (9) into (7), while assuming symmetry, gives the following
differential equation (note that the value of the firm is the same for all firms so



















ln |V ′| + α1 = Y, (11)
where α1 is the constant of integration, and













2n − 1 . (12)
The constant α1 is obtained from (11) valued at Y = 0 where, from (8), we
know that the value of the project6 equals Rnc(n). Thus,
α1 = −2n− 12br V
′(0) − na
2br
ln |V ′(0)| . (13)
Let Ȳnc−nc be the largest value for Y for which it is profitable to carry out












ln |−a| − 2n − 1
2br
V ′(0) − na
2br
ln |V ′(0)| . (15)
Note that for Ȳnc−nc the value of the project V (Ȳnc−nc) = 0. Only projects that
require an initial amount of total R&D investments below this critical level will















6Here we employ that equation (11) defines V as a function of Y (and therefore, also V ′
through (12)), which is ensured by the implicit function theorem.
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Projects with a required total amount of R&D improvement below Ȳnc−nc
have a positive value, since the cost of the R&D effort carried out during the
planning horizon [0, T ] falls below the final gain. Note that the assessment of
the project is carried out through the net present value rule. Then, Ȳnc−nc is
the value for which a R&D project has a zero net present value.
3.2 Cooperation in R&D
When firms cooperate in R&D, the problem for the RJV is given by (5). Per-
forming the same steps as in the non-cooperative case, we have that the value

















ln |W ′| + αi = Y, i = 2, 3 (17)
where α2, α3 ∈ R are the constants of integration when firms in the RJV compete
or cooperate in the output market, respectively. The root of (16) that guarantees
a positive control is
























∣∣∣∣∣+ αi = Y, i = 2, 3 (18)
with the boundary condition W (0) = nRc(n) in case firms in the RJV also co-
operate in the output market, or W (0) = nRnc(n) when there is no cooperation
once the R&D phase is finished. These two cases are denoted by the subscripts
(c-c) and (c-nc), respectively.
In order to determine the constant of integration α, we must take into ac-
count the behavior of firms in the output market. When there is no cooperation
in output (c-nc), we know that when Y = 0 the RJV value of the project, Wc−nc,
9












∣∣∣−a − 2√brRnc (n)∣∣∣ . (19)
Let Ȳc−nc be the maximal R&D improvement for the RJV for which it is
still profitable to carry out the R&D project. From the continuity of the control
























∣∣∣−a − 2√brRnc (n)∣∣∣ . (20)
As before, only projects that require an initial amount of total R&D improve-
ment below this critical level will be interesting for the firm as a participant in















In case firms cooperate in both phases of the game (c-c) we know that when












∣∣∣−a − 2√brRc (n)∣∣∣ . (21)
Denoting by Ȳc−c the total maximal R&D improvement that the RJV could
carry out profitably in the fully cooperative case, then as before it holds that
W ′c−c(Ȳc−c) = −a, where the optimal control is zero. Finally, we can determine


















∣∣∣−a − 2√brRc (n)∣∣∣ . (22)
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4 Analysis of results
We first compare the level of profitable total R&D improvement in the three
cases analyzed above for a given number of firms in the industry, as well as the
optimal per-firm improvement rate for a given project size.7 Results are shown
in the following propositions, which are proved in Appendix B.
Proposition 1 Let Ȳs, (s = c − c, c − nc, nc − nc), be the maximal total R&D
improvement that the RJV can face profitably. Then, for a given number of firms
in the RJV, it holds that
Ȳc−c > Ȳc−nc > Ȳnc−nc.
Proposition 2 Given a level of pending work, Ỹ , the per-firm R&D improve-
ment rates xs(Ỹ ), (s = c − c, c − nc, nc − nc), satisfy
xc−c(Ỹ ) > xc−nc(Ỹ ) > xnc−nc(Ỹ ).
As expected, the higher the degree of cooperation, the larger the total R&D
improvement needed to achieve the innovation that the RJV could bear prof-
itably. When firms cooperate in the R&D phase they internalize the effect that
the R&D effort of one firm has on the profits of the other firms in the RJV
(the combined-profits externality according to Kamien et al., 1992), and con-
sequently they are able to obtain more profit from cooperation. Note that the
inequality Ȳc−nc(n) > Ȳnc−nc(n) can be seen as the increase in efficiency that
firms obtain when they coordinate their R&D decisions, since the final gain is
equal. In the fully cooperative case the higher final gain is due to the fact that
7All the results below hold for n ≥ 2, while for n = 1 results coincide in the three cases.
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firms are acting as a joint monopolist in the output market, and thus they are
able to acquire a major part of the surplus created.
Next we analyze the behavior of the maximal profitable total R&D improve-
ment with respect to changes in the final gain.8 To do so, we differentiate Ȳs,










In the three cases the corresponding critical level Ȳs is increasing in R (n), so
that the larger R, the larger the total amount of required improvement that the










that the increase in Ȳ is diminishing in R. This holds because the costs related
to the achieved improvement are convex. This implies that in case we duplicate
the final gain, duplicating the effort needed in order to get the final gain would
imply multiplying the associated costs more than twice.
Proposition 2 states that the R&D effort is higher the higher the degree
of the cooperation, leading to a faster time to completion and thus a quicker
achievement of the process innovation. This is a relevant issue since the sooner
the innovation is achieved and translated to production, the sooner the corre-
sponding increase of private benefits (higher firm profits) and social benefits
(lower prices and higher output) takes place. By only taking into account the
size of a project, firms could be indifferent on the RJV organizational struc-
ture that firms choose to engage. However, the required time to complete also
matters. In order to illustrate this point, Table 1 shows the required time to
complete9 a project requiring the maximal total R&D improvement (column 3)
8As the ratio (A−c)/B yields a measure of market size and profitability, and since the final
gain is proportional to this ratio, the response of Ȳ to a change in R can also be interpreted
as the way the market size influences the critical level of R&D projects. In general, R&D
investment incentives in cost reduction are positively related to the level of output, because
the innovation costs can then be spread over a larger number of products.
9We have used Matlab software for computing the time to complete. The quadrature al-
gorithms do not allow to start the integration process from the exact value of Ȳ , so that we
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and the required time to complete a R&D project with a given size (column 4).
With respect to the R&D improvement rate, xs, (s = c− c, c− nc, nc− nc),
by differentiating it with respect to Y , where the expressions of ∂V ′(Y )/∂Y and
∂W ′(Y )/∂Y are obtained from (11) and (17) and the implicit function theorem,
respectively, we obtain that the control variable is a strictly decreasing concave







Therefore, the smaller the total pending work (reducing Y ), the larger the opti-
mal effort, that is, the intensity of the research effort increases (at a decreasing
rate) as the pending work diminishes until the project is completed at T , where
Y (T ) = 0 and the firms in the RJV reduce their unit production cost.
Departing from (1), we can also analyze how the pending work and the
per-firm R&D improvement rate evolve over time.10 While the pending work,







the R&D improvement rate, xs, (s = c− c, c−nc, nc− nc), is an increasing and







so that, as pointed out previously, at the moment that the investment effort
is maximal the time to completion of the innovation ends. This behavior is in
accordance with the empirical results pointed out in Scherer (1967):“...the time
pattern of R&D outlays is typically bell-shaped, with the peak rate of spending
occurring at the time when the end product is put into production.”
compute the time to complete with an error of 0.001 with respect to these values. While dif-
ferences are minimal for the (c-nc) and (c-c) cases, for the case of (nc-nc) the time to complete
could differ with small changes in the error value, because the optimal control is quite low at




The explicit consideration of a positive time to develop a breakthrough also
stresses the importance of value of the discount rate. By differentiating Ȳs with
respect to r, we obtain that
∂Ȳs
∂r
< 0, (s = c − c, c − nc, nc − nc).
We conclude that in the three cases studied the maximal total amount of R&D
investment being profitable to undertake decreases when r increases. This is the
case since the stream of costs extends over the entire planning horizon whereas
the final gain is obtained at the end of the R&D period.
4.1 Optimal size of the RJV
In this section we analyze the optimal size of the RJV. As the number of firms
in the RJV increases, the required per-firm R&D effort for a given project is
lower. However, at the same time the number of firms in the output market
increases, so that the final gain reduces.
Contributions that study the optimal number of firms in an industry are,
for instance, De Bondt et al. (1992) and Poyago-Theotoky (1995). Both papers
analyze an industry where firms produce a differentiated or homogeneous prod-
uct with R&D aimed at cost reduction. Decreasing returns of the innovative
activity are modeled through a quadratic cost function for the R&D invest-
ments. While Poyago-Theotoky (1995) explicitly considers the formation of an
RJV with a subset of the firms in the industry, De Bondt et al. (1992) analyzes
a whole industry acting non-cooperatively in both R&D and output stages. In
both papers the optimal size of the RJV11 depends on the degree of spillovers.
For the perfect spillover case Poyago-Theotoky (1995) finds that the equilibrium
size of the RJV is equal to the total number of firms in the industry, which is
also the socially optimal size of an RJV.12 On the contrary, in De Bondt et al.
11Concerning De Bondt et al. (1992), we associate the RJV case with their perfect spillover
case.
12In her setting the equilibrium size is given by the number of firms that maximizes the
profits of any individual member of the RJV while the socially optimum size corresponds to
the number of firms that maximize joint industry profits for RJV and non-RJV firms.
14
(1992) the optimal size corresponds to the duopoly case.13 Other models that
exhibit perfect spillovers, although with R&D aimed at product differentiation
rather than cost reduction, such as Cellini and Lambertini (2002), find that,
when firms compete in R&D and output, R&D investments are positively re-
lated to the number of firms. This effect is due to the fact that a larger number
of firms increases the incentive to invest in R&D in order to decrease competi-
tion through product differentiation. Note that in such a framework there is no
incentive at all to perform R&D in case of a monopoly.
From the perspective of the firms (welfare is considered later), we define the
optimal size of the RJV by the number of firms n∗ for which the RJV exhibits
the maximal profitable amount of R&D improvement, i.e.,
Ȳs(n∗) > Ȳs(n∗ − 1) and Ȳs(n∗) > Ȳs(n∗ + 1),
where s = c − c, c − nc, nc − nc, and let ∆Ȳs(n) = Ȳs(n + 1) − Ȳs(n), (s =
c− c, c−nc, nc−nc). If ∆Ȳs(n) > 0, an RJV consisting of more firms would be
desirable since, although per-firm final gains are lower with more firms acting
in the output market, the increase in R&D efficiency associated with sharing
R&D efforts, which have decreasing returns because of the quadratic structure
of the cost function, will allow the RJV to face larger R&D projects. On the
contrary, when ∆Ȳs(n) < 0 the R&D performance of the RJV would increase
with less firms participating in the RJV.
Because of the complexity of the expressions for ∆Ȳs(n), we rely on numerical
simulations for the cases (nc-nc) and (c-nc) to state the following result on the
sign of ∆Ȳ :
Corollary 1 In the cases (nc-nc) and (c-nc) there exists at most one positive
real root ns for the equation ∆Ȳs(n) = 0, s = nc − nc, c − nc. It holds that
13In De Bondt et al. (1992) the monopoly case is not analyzed explicitly, but by deriving
the optimal R&D effort for the monopolist and comparing it with the duopoly case, it can
be shown that while R&D investments are maximal with only one firm in the output market,
for not “too large” values of the parameter Γ in their cost function, total industry profits are
higher if R&D is conducted for two firms, so that the efficiency effect leads to an optimal size
of the RJV of n = 2.
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nnc−nc ∈ (0, 2) and nc−nc ∈ (0,∞). In the case (c-c) we have that ∆Yc−c(n) > 0
for all n.
Corollary 1 states that when firms compete in the output market, there
is a non-monotonic relation between the number of firms in the RJV and the
R&D performance, irrespective of their attitude in the RJV. This non-monotonic
relation leads to the existence of an optimal size of the RJV. We conclude
that this result is placed between the Schumpeterian hypothesis, which relates
R&D investment to profits associated with the innovation, and therefore with
the extent of market power, being maximal for the monopoly, and Arrowian
positions where R&D investments are negatively associated with market power
and profits.
The optimal size of the RJV depends on the trade-off between benefits from
sharing with a larger number of participants and the profit loss associated with
increased competition in the output market. To illustrate, we perform a nu-
merical analysis with respect to Ȳ for the cases (nc-nc) and (c-nc). Results are
shown in Table 2.
An increase in the cost function always leads to a reduction in the maximal
profitable total R&D improvement since total profitability of the innovation
project reduces. However, what determines a better R&D performance for a
larger number of firms in the RJV is not the total cost but the weight of the
quadratic term in the cost function. An increase in b/a raises the incentive to
have more firms in the RJV. The reason is that an individual firm can cut down
on R&D improvement if the number of firms increase. This especially leads to
a considerable cost reduction if b is large. Hence, we obtain that the optimal
size for the RJV will not only depend on the degree of spillovers (in our RJV
setting always maximal), but also on the relative weight of the quadratic vs. the
linear term in the cost function. This result is the more important because the
inclusion of a linear term in the cost function seems reasonable, at least in some
cases, to avoid a null marginal cost for initial R&D efforts.
In order to assess the influence of the linear term (a) in our cost function
16
and also to connect our results with those of De Bondt et al. (1992) and Poyago-
Theotoky (1995), where only the quadratic term appears in their cost function,
we drop out this term by taking the limit of Ȳnc−nc(n) and Ȳc−nc(n) when a
goes to zero, and obtain that

















(A − ĉ)2 − (A − c)2
bBr2
. (27)
It is straightforward to see that Ȳ a=0nc−nc(n) has a maximum at n = 2, and that
∂Ȳ a=0c−nc(n)/∂n > 0, ∀n. We conclude that the optimal size of the RJV for the
(nc-nc) case is achieved at n∗ = 2 (De Bondt et al., 1992). However, in the
general case, i.e., with a = 0, this size depends on the ratio b/a. For the (c-nc)
case and a = 0 it is optimal for the RJV to contain all the firms in the industry,
which coincides with Poyago-Theotoky (1995), while for the general case (a = 0)
the optimal size can be any n∗ ∈ [1, n].
For the total cooperative case (c-c) it holds that the larger the number of
firms in the RJV, the better the RJV’s R&D performance. This result confirms
fears on incentives of firms to curtail competition after the R&D cooperation
phase, since a fully cooperative agreement between firms would allow them
to obtain a positive gain by carrying out R&D projects that would be non-
profitable under a different scenario. One way to take advantage of the best
R&D performance associated with the fully cooperative case while avoiding an-
titrust regulation is to form an inter-industry or international RJV, so that
firms can benefit from R&D cost reduction without negative effects of compe-
tition in their respective output markets. In this sense, Steurs (1995) concludes
that inter-industry R&D cooperation is more likely to result in higher R&D
investment than intra-industry R&D cooperation. To see why in the fully coop-
erative case the cost saving effect dominates the profit loss in the output market







a ln |−a| + 2
√
brRc (n) − a ln
∣∣∣−a− 2√brRc (n)∣∣∣} . (28)
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Now, from (4) we have that Rc(n) = (1/n)Rc(1) and considering, for instance,





















being the per-firm final gain, which is exactly one half of the gain for the
monopoly. Owing to the quadratic R&D structure the firms prefer the case
where both Ȳc−c and Rc are halved. A similar reasoning holds for further in-
creases of n. Moreover, the joint effort rate for the cooperative case is higher
when the number of firms is larger. This implies a shorter time to completion
for a given project.
We summarize the former results in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Let n∗ be the optimal size for the RJV, then:
1. Case (nc-nc): n∗ = 2 if a = 0, and n∗ ≤ 2 if a > 0.
2. Case (c-nc): n∗ = ∞ if a = 0, and n∗ decreases with a/b.
3. Case (c-c): n∗ = ∞ ∀a.
4.2 Output market with differentiated products
We now briefly discuss the effect of having some degree of differentiation in
the output market. As pointed out previously, this assumption will only affect
the final gain associated with the innovation. Obviously, when some positive
degree of differentiation exists in the output market, per-firm profits are higher
than those with a homogeneous output. Therefore, the maximal total R&D
improvement that an RJV can carry out profitably is higher, as seen before.
Here, we assume that the n firms in the industry sell n differentiated prod-
ucts, and that the inverse demand function for a variety i is pi = A − Bqi −
D
∑
j =i qj , i = 1, . . . , n, where D ∈ [0, B] is the symmetric degree of substi-
tutability between any pair of varieties, so that when D = B products are
completely homogeneous, and when D = 0 products are totally independent. In
18
the latter case each firm acts as a monopolist. The final gain functions for the
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4[B + (n − 1)D] −
(A − c)2
4[B + (n − 1)D]
)
. (30)
It is straightforward to see that as the degree of product differentiation
increases (D decreases), gains from innovation, (29) and (30), also increase.
Therefore, the more differentiated the products are, the larger the maximal
total R&D improvement that an RJV can carry out profitably, i.e.
∂Ȳs
∂D
< 0, (s = nc − nc, c − nc, c − c).
In a similar way we obtain that for a given level of pending work, Ỹ , the per-firm




< 0, (s = nc − nc, c − nc, c − c).
The implication is that an RJV with firms operating in a more differentiated
product market will complete R&D projects in a shorter time.
We finally consider the optimal size of the RJV with differentiated products.






[2B + (n − 1)D]
√








[2B + (n − 1)D]
√
B ((A − ĉ)2 − (A − c)2)
br2
.
Now, Proposition 3 can be generalized directly14 in the following way:
Proposition 4 Let n∗ be the optimal size for the RJV, with participating firms
selling products with a degree of differentiation of D ∈ [0, B], then:
14For the (nc-nc) case, note that if 2B/D /∈ N when a = 0, then n∗ must be determined
according to the sign of ∆Ȳnc−nc(n) at the integer part of 2B/D.
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1. Case (nc-nc): n∗ = 2BD if a = 0, and n
∗ ≤ 2BD if a > 0.
2. Case (c-nc): n∗ = ∞ if a = 0, and n∗ decreases with a/b.
3. Case (c-c): n∗ = ∞ ∀a.
Note that in the fully non-cooperative case the upper bound (2B/D) for the
optimal size of the RJV tends to infinity as products become more differentiated
(D → 0). When D = 0 firms are monopolists, so that the larger the number
of firms in the RJV, the higher the savings from sharing R&D efforts, while
they will not suffer negative effects on the per-firm final gain because of the
independence of their output markets.
5 Welfare analysis
The welfare performance of the R&D policies analyzed above can be gauged and
compared in terms of several alternative criteria. We follow Suzumura (1992),
and assume that competition in the output market lies beyond the regulatory







P (Q)dQ − ĉQj(ĉ) −
∫ Qj(c)
0
P (Q)dQ − cQj(c)
)
, (31)
where Qj(c), (j = nc, c), is the industry output under Cournot and Monopoly
situations for a unit production cost of c, respectively. The objective function
of the social planner is









axj (t) + bx2j (t)
]




Note that the problem for the social planner is similar, except for the final gain
given by (31), to that of the RJV when firms cooperate. In the previous sec-
tion we have seen that the maximal profitable R&D project positively depends
on the final gain. Since the social planner also considers the improvement in
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consumer surplus associated with the innovation, which leads to higher produc-
tion and lower prices, it holds that RSc > nRc(n) and R
S
nc > nRnc(n), so that
Ȳ Sj > Ȳc−j , (j = nc, c), where Ȳ
S
j is the social critical level of the R&D project.
Hence, the social planner would start R&D projects that firms in the RJV do
not consider profitable, pointing to a socially inefficient behavior in the three
analyzed cases.
Moreover, the social planner would commit a larger amount of resources
to profitable projects than any RJV structure, leading to lower total times to
complete a given project. Policy implications are, therefore, that the government
should promote cooperative agreements between firms, as well as take actions
such as direct aids (e.g., investment grants or investment tax credits) to reach
a higher level of R&D spending, in order to improve social welfare.
With respect to the optimal size of the RJV from the point of view of the
social planner, it always comprises all the firms in the industry. For the case of
competition in the output market, this results comes directly by observing that
the gain in social welfare, i.e., the change in the consumer surplus together with




n2((A − ĉ)2 − (A − c)2)
2B(n + 1)2
+




If firms compete in the output market, total industry profits decrease with more
firms, but aggregate quantity is higher and product price lower, so that the
consumer surplus increases and offsets the loss in the industry profits. Finally,
in the case of collusion in the output market, total industry profits remain
constant with more firms, as well as the consumer surplus, but in this case, as
shown in the former section, it is always desirable for the RJV to incorporate
more firms because of the gain in R&D efficiency.
Finally, note that this analysis extends in a straightforward way when there
exists some degree of differentiation in the output market. As seen before, in
that case firms in the RJV increase their R&D investments with the degree
of product differentiation. However, the social planner will also find the RJV’s
R&D policy socially inefficient.
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6 Concluding remarks
We have taken a differential game approach to analyze the RJV’s R&D efforts
when the completeness of a process innovation requires a known given amount
of R&D improvement, Y0. Depending on the organizational structure of the
RJV we study the maximal amount of R&D improvement that an RJV can
undertake profitably, and determine the optimal effort for every level of pending
work during the research process.
Results obtained show that the coordination of the firm’s R&D efforts is
optimal from a double perspective. First, cooperation increases the ability to
manage larger innovation projects. Second, under cooperation it is optimal to
spend more resources in a given R&D project, which leads to a faster completion
of the innovation process and, consequently, to a sooner appropriation of the
private benefits (higher firm profits) and social benefits (lower prices and higher
output) associated with the innovation. With respect to the timing of R&D
investments, we have shown that the R&D improvement rate is an increasing
and strictly convex function of time, so that R&D investments are maximal at
the final stages of the process innovation.
We further established some results regarding the optimal size for the RJV.
We show that this optimal size depends heavily on the cost function of R&D
investments. While in the fully cooperative case it is always desirable to increase
the number of firms, in the other scenarios the optimal number of firms depends
on the relative weight of the quadratic and linear terms in the cost function.
Finally, a comparison with the social planner’s optimal R&D efforts shows
that society would consider it profitable to carry out projects that an RJV,
irrespectively of its organizational structure, would reject. And for profitable
projects, society would address more resources to every stage of the project,
pointing to a permanent delay in the introduction of new technologies from the
social point of view.
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Appendix A: Derivation of V (Y )
In order to solve (10) we rewrite it as:












By definition, dV = V ′dY. Differentiating (33) we obtain that dV = Φ′ (V ′) dV ′.






















ln |V ′| + α
where α ∈ R.






























2n− 1 . (36)
Next we study which of these two solutions is feasible for the studied problem.
The minimal R&D effort that each firm can perform is zero and let Ȳnc−nc be
the maximal R&D improvement that each firm considers the RJV can face
profitably under a non-cooperative attitude in the R&D phase. Therefore, from












In order to assure positive values for the control variable, and from (9), it is
required that
V ′ < −a. (38)
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First we analyze the solution given by (36). Solving (36) for V = 0 we have
that
Ψ2 (0) = − a2n− 1 ,
which contradicts (37). Since b and r are positive, we also have that V ′ is an
increasing function of V, so that the optimal control would always be negative.
Now we study the solution obtained from (35). Solving it for V = 0, we
obtain that V ′ = −a, that is, the value reached at Ȳnc−nc. Moreover, V ′ is now
a decreasing function of V , and this guarantees (38). Then we take (35) as the
differential equation to be satisfied by the value function V for each firm in the
RJV.
Appendix B: Proofs of the propositions and main
results
Proof of Proposition 1. We first prove that Ȳc−c > Ȳc−nc. First, we define the
function





By subtracting Ȳc−nc from Ȳc−c, we conclude that Ȳc−c > Ȳc−nc holds if f(ξ1) >
f(ξ2), where ξ1 = −a − 2
√
brRc(n) and ξ2 = −a − 2
√
brRnc(n). Then, since
f(·) is a (strictly) decreasing function for ξ < −a, Rc(n) > Rnc(n) implies that
ξ1 < ξ2, so that f(ξ1) > f(ξ2).
Note also that f(ξ1) = α3 and f(ξ2) = α2, where α2 and α3 are the constants
of integration given in (19) and (21), respectively. Therefore, we also have that
α3 > α2, which is a result that we will use below.
Next, we prove that Ȳc−nc > Ȳnc−nc. We obtain from (15) and 20), that the
former inequality holds if




























By taking exponentials of both sides of (40), and then the second-degree Taylor










which after some calculations can be shown to hold.
Proof of Proposition 2. As xs(Ỹ ), s = c − c, c − nc, nc − nc, is given by the
expression −(1/2b)(a+γ(Ỹ )), γ(Ỹ ) = W ′c−c(Ỹ ), W ′c−nc(Ỹ ), V ′(Ỹ ), we will show
that W ′c−c < W ′c−nc < V ′, in order to construct the proof for Proposition 2.
We first look at the case W ′c−c < W
′
c−nc, i.e., xc−c(Ỹ ) > xc−nc(Ỹ ). Let
f(·) be as defined in (39), which attains a minimum at ξ = −a (note that the
functions W ′c−c, W
′
c−nc and V
′ will only reach values less or equal than −a for
any (given) admissible level of pending work Ỹ ). Now, the expressions for the
solution of the value function in the fully cooperative case (given in (18) with α
as in (21)) and for the value function when cooperation arises only in the R&D
stage ( given in (18) with α as in (19)) can be rewritten, respectively, into
f(W ′c−c(Ỹ )) = −(Ỹ − α3),
and
f(W ′c−nc(Ỹ )) = −(Ỹ − α2).
Since f(·) decreases on the admissible range for W ′s(Y ), s = c − c, c − nc, and
α3 > α2, it follows that W ′c−c(Ỹ ) < W ′c−nc(Ỹ ).
Finally, in order to prove that W ′c−nc < V , i.e., xc−nc(Ỹ ) > xnc−nc(Ỹ ), we
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define the functions











ln|ξ| + α2. (43)
with α1 as in (13). In order to compare g and h, we find the intersection point
between both functions, ξ̄ ∈ R/g(ξ̄) = h(ξ̄), so that
ξ̄ =
2br
n − 1(α2 − α1), (44)
and now we check that ξ̄ > −a. Substituting the expressions for α1 and α2 into
(44), and rearranging terms in the inequality ξ̄ > −a, we obtain expression (40),
which was shown to be satisfied. Then, as g and h are continuous functions on
their domains, we have that for ξ ≤ −a it holds that either g > h or g < h.
Note that both functions, g and h, valued at ξ = −a are, respectively, Ȳnc−nc
and Ȳc−nc, so that, for ξ ≤ −a it holds that g < h. Then, for any given level of
pending work Ỹ ≤ Ȳnc−nc, we have that
g−1(Ỹ ) = V ′(Ỹ ) > h−1(Ỹ ) = W ′c−nc(Ỹ ). (45)
Proof of Corollary 1. As pointed before, the results for the (nc-nc) and (c-nc)
cases rely on numerical simulations. For the (c-c) case, and in order to prove
that ∆Ȳc−c(n) > 0 we calculate the derivative of Ȳc−c(n) with respect to n, and
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Finally, this inequality holds if











As before, we take exponentials of both sides of (46), and then the second-degree











which after some calculations can be shown to hold.
Proof of Expressions (24) and (25). As the analysis is initially similar for
the three cases (nc-nc, c-nc, c-c), we omit subscripts where no confusion could
arise. We first prove that ∂Y (t)/∂t < 0 and ∂2Y (t)/∂t2 < 0. From (1) and the
symmetric behavior assumption, we have that
Ẏ = −nx and Ÿ = −n ∂x
∂Y
Ẏ . (47)
As the control variable is assumed to be non-negative and with (23), the strict
concavity of Y (t) follows.
We now consider ∂x(t)/∂t > 0, and ∂2x(t)/∂t2 > 0. Differentiating (1) with
respect to t and rearranging terms we have that













The sign of (48) comes from (23) and the sign of Ẏ shown above. On the other
hand, the sign of (49) will depend on the sign of the expression inside square
brackets, which, after substituting the expression for the control variable x =


















Now, from (11) and (18) and the implicit function theorem, we can calculate
∂γ(Y )/∂Y and ∂2γ(Y )/∂Y 2, ∀Y ∈ [0, Ȳ ).
We first consider the cases (c-nc) and (c-c) because of their symmetry, that











n (a + W ′s)
2
2brW ′s
n (a + W ′s)
.
By substituting these expressions into (50), and after some calculations (taking
into account that W ′s(Y ) < −a) it can be shown that the sign of (50) is negative.
Therefore, coming back to (49) we have that ẍ > 0.










(an + (2n − 1)V ′)2
2brV ′
an + (2n − 1)V ′ .
Substituting the former expressions into (50), and after some calculations it can
be shown that the sign of (50) is negative for the (nc-nc) case. Therefore, coming
back to (49) we also have that ẍ > 0.
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n = 2 Ȳ T (Ȳ ) T (Y0 = 200)
nc-nc 409.31 145.44 12.14
c-nc 512.91 32.97 5.64
c-c 554.49 33.93 5.24
Table 1: Time to complete and maximal profitable total R&D improvement for
parameter values: a = 1, b = 0.1, r = 0.05, A = 100, B = 10, c = 70 and ĉ = 30.
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a n∗nc−nc Ȳnc−nc n∗c−nc Ȳc−nc
0.001 2 728.637 52 1212.553
0.01 2 718.302 19 1122.574
0.1 2 655.978 7 909.253
1 1 433.332 3 520.865
10 1 142.37 1 142.37
Table 2: Optimal size of the RJV for parameter values: b = 0.1, r = 0.05,
A = 100, B = 10, c = 70 and ĉ = 30.
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